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Abstract. A farmer’s decision to contract or produce independently depends on the distribution 
of income under both arrangements, and on attributes associated with both business 
arrangements.  Risk-averse farmers should be willing to pay a risk premium for the reduction in 
price risk provided by a contract.  Farmers with a preference for "autonomy" should be willing to 
pay a premium for certain attributes associated with independent production, such as the right to 
make management decisions and own the commodity they produce. The benefits to growers 
from contracting (such as risk reduction) may be over-estimated if the non-pecuniary benefits 
enjoyed by independent producers are not accounted for. This study uses national survey data to 
estimate the risk premium, the change in expected income, and the autonomy premium 
associated with hog production contracts. 
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1. Introduction 
Several studies have demonstrated that contracts reduce the income risk of livestock growers, 
implying that risk-averse growers should be willing to pay a premium for these contracts (e.g., 
Kliebenstein and Lawrence; Johnson and Foster; Martin). Parcell and Langemeier use this logic 
to determine the minimum level of contract payments required for contract growing to be 
preferred to independent production for growers with different levels of risk aversion.  Among 
other results, Johnson and Foster determine the breakeven levels of risk aversion at which point 
farmers switch their order of preferences for different types of contracts and independent 
production. 
In addition to the distribution of income under both arrangements, a farmer’s decision to 
contract versus produce and market goods independently will depend on attributes associated 
with both arrangements. Farmers with a preference for "autonomy" will need to be compensated 
by contractors for giving up nonpecuniary benefits associated with independent production. 
Nonpecuniary benefits associated with independent production may include the sense of 
responsibility associated with making management decisions, the sense of independence that 
comes from being self-supervised, or pride related ownership of the product.  These benefits are 
greater under independent production because contracts usually require growers to surrender 
some control over the production process, and submit to various rules regarding management 
decisions. In addition, contracts often designate legal ownership of the crop or livestock to the 
contractor.  Other non-pecuniary net benefits from independent production may result from 
negative attributes associated with contracting – for example, contracting may cause growers to 
feel vulnerable to changes in contract terms, or other forms of manipulation by contractors.    
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These types of grower concerns are demonstrated by recent legislative efforts to regulate 
agricultural contracts such as the Producer Protection Act  (Boehlje, et al). 
If growers prefer autonomy then the minimum level of payments required for growers to 
accept a contract will be greater, all else equal.  Consequently, studies that incorrectly assume 
that growers are indifferent between the attributes of independent or contract production, will 
under-estimate the contract payment necessary for growers to accept a contract, or will 
underestimate the level of risk aversion required for a grower to accept a contract. Similarly, 
studies that infer attitudes toward risk based on the premium that contractees are willing to pay to 
enter a contract will under-estimate grower risk aversion – attributing a relatively small (or even 
negative) risk premium to a grower’s lack of risk aversion rather than to a grower’s preference 
for autonomy.   
The goal of this study is to estimate the nonpecuniary benefits of independent farming, 
paying particular attention to the importance of risk reduction in farmers’ decision to contract or 
remain independent. Researchers have long been interested in measuring the value that workers 
place on nonpecuniary aspects of their work.  Examples of this research include measuring the 
value lawyers place on “public-interest” versus private-sector work (Goddeeris, 1988); the 
willingness to pay for job safety (e.g., Viscusi and Hersh, 2001); the nonpecuniary benefits of 
self-employment (e.g., Hamilton, 2000); and non-pecuniary rewards associated with leadership 
(Cavalluzzo, 1991). Understanding growers’ incentives to contract is particularly important in 
analyses of the structural changes taking place in the hog sector as the adoption of new business 
arrangements has important consequences for efficiency and grower welfare.  
Rather than using a contingent valuation survey to estimate the value farmers place on 
their autonomy (e.g., Gillespie and Eidman), this paper takes a new approach that uses detailed    
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information on returns to contract and independent feeder-to-finish hog production.   First, we 
use information from a national survey of feeder-to-finish hog producers and ten years of 
monthly price data to estimate the mean and coefficient of variation of net returns from 
independent hog production. Second, using the same national survey we use a treatment effects 
model to estimate how much of the difference in per unit income between contract and 
independent operations can be attributed to contracting. For a given level of risk aversion, we use 
the estimated variation in contract and non-contract income to compute the risk premium – the 
amount a representative grower would pay for the risk reducing benefits of the contract. Finally, 
we estimate the autonomy premium – the nonpecuniary benefits of independent production – as 
the sum of the expected difference in contract and non-contract income and the risk premium.  
The next section provides a theoretical basis for the empirical approach used in sections 3 and 4. 
 
2.   Theory 
If farmers prefer the attributes of independent production to those of contract production and 
each business arrangement earns the same certain fixed income  0 Y , then growers will always 
experience greater utility under independent production 
I U  compared to under contract 
C U : 
 
(1)   () () 0 0 Y U Y U
C I > . 
 
In hog producing regions there are often few contractors, which may allow contractors to 
exercise monopsony power. When this is the case, contractors need only pay contractees their 
reservation wage, so that contractees are indifferent between contract and independent 
production:    
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(2)   () ()
C C I I Y EU Y EU = , 
 
where 
I Y  and 
C Y  are the uncertain net returns from independent and contract production. For 
(1) and (2) to hold, the “benefit” from contracting resulting from the change in average income 
and lower risk must exactly compensate for the lower utility resulting from the loss of autonomy.  
Hence, the “autonomy premium” α  can be defined as this benefit – the amount the independent 
farmer would be willing to pay for the income distribution available under contract: 
 
() ( ) α − =
C I I I Y EU Y EU  
 
Following Newbery and Stiglitz (pp 92-93), the benefit α  to a scheme that changes the mean 
and variance of income can be approximated as the change in expected income plus a risk 
premium  ρ : 
 
(3)  () ρ α + − ≅
I C Y Y      where,  () () []
I C I Y CV CV R *
2
1 2 2
− = ρ     
 
The risk premium is a function of the coefficient of relative risk aversion R, and the 
reduction in the coefficient of variation of income due to contracting.
1 The autonomy premium is 
positive if the farmer prefers autonomy.  If the risk premium is zero (the farmer is risk neutral) 
then the autonomy premium is just the gain in expected income from contracting.  If contracting 
                                                 
1  By definition,  () () Y U Y U Y R ' ' ' − = .    
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and independent production have the same expected income, then the autonomy premium equals 
the risk premium. Note that (3) places no a priori restrictions on the sign or relative magnitude of 
the autonomy premium – α  can be positive or negative and bigger or smaller than the risk 
premium.  
Finally, the “contract premium”  t ∆  can be defined as the additional income in period t 






t Y Y ∆ + =   
 
The expected contract premium  ∆ E  is therefore the expected income from contracting less the 
expected income from independent farming. 
Figure 1 illustrates the risk and autonomy premia, in the simple case where income from 
independent production can be low 
I
L Y  or high 
I
H Y , and income from contracting 
C Y  does not 
vary (
C C EY Y = ).  In the figure,  () Y U
I  is the utility from income given that the farmer is 
independent. The utility function is concave due to the risk aversion of the farmer.  As shown in 
the figure, contracting provides a lower level of utility  () Y U
C  at any level of income, for the 
reasons discussed above. 
If the contract income does not vary, the risk premium ρ  is the difference between the 
expected income under independent production 




If the farmer contracts, his risk is lowered, he loses autonomy, and he receives a different 
                                                 
2 This is the definition of the risk premium.  It can be shown (e.g. Newberry and Stiglitz, p 69-73) that for the 
situation described in the graphical analysis,  ()






 = ρ , which is consistent with (3).    
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expected income. Because the farmer is paid his reservation wage, the benefit that contracting 
provides in terms of the reduction in risk and the change in expected income must just 
compensate for the loss of autonomy. Hence, the autonomy premium α  is the risk premium plus 
the difference in expected income (positive or negative) between contracting and independent 
production.  In the figure, the risk premium is larger than the autonomy premium, but this is not 
necessarily the case.  
For the income distribution illustrated in figure 1, in low price years the contracting 
premium is positive, while in high price years the premium is negative.  Our survey was 
conducted in 1998, a year with unusually low prices for finished hogs.  As a result, it would not 
be surprising if the contract premium was positive in 1998, even if contracting has a lower 
expected income than independent production. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
It is possible to compute the risk and autonomy premia as functions of the relative risk aversion 
coefficient using (3), given estimates of the mean and coefficient of variation of income for both 
independent and contract operations.  We obtain these estimates in two steps. First, we estimate 
the mean and coefficient of variation of income for a representative independent hog producer 
using historical product and input price data.  Second, we estimate the contract premium in the 
survey year using a treatment effects model.  Conditional on the assumption that contract and 
independent incomes covary (as explained below), it is possible to estimate the mean and 
coefficient of variation of contract income. 
Data are from two sources: operator and farm level data are from the 1998 USDA ARMS 
of the hog sector, and county-level characteristics are from the 1997 US Agricultural Census.    
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Table 1 reports the results of tests of equal means between contract and independent operations 
for the variables used in this section.
3  Table 1 lists the mean values of the variables used in this 
section. As shown in the table, both contract and independent operators earned negative per unit 
net returns on average in 1998.
 4  However, contract operators earned significantly more – 
earning on average $19.21 more per hundredweight of hog produced. 
The table highlights several clear differences between the two groups.  On average, 
contractees are younger and have much less experience in the hog business. Contractees do not 
have significantly more total assets employed in farming, yet they produce over three times as 
much pork.  Contract and independent producers are also located in different geographical 
regions and contract operations are much larger than independent producers. 
  
3.1 Independent Production 
The mean and coefficient of variation of independent hog income is estimated using 
measures of the value of production and costs derived from the 1998 USDA Agricultural 
Resource Management Study (ARMS) of the hog sector, and ten years of monthly hog and feed 
prices from the National Agricultural Statistics Service. Because of the broad differences in 
production techniques among various types of hog operations, we limit the ARMS data to feeder 
pig-to-finish hog operations.
5  This group of producers accounted for about a third of total 
finished hog farms and production in 1998. 
                                                 
3 In computing the difference of means, parameters, and significance tests in all the regressions in the paper, the 
survey data were weighted to account for sample design.  
4 Net return per unit is defined as revenue from hog production less the costs of all inputs to hog production except 
unpaid labor that were incurred by the operator per hundredweight of hog produced. For independent operators, 
revenue equals the gross value of hog production. For contract operators revenue equals contract fees for hogs 
produced under contract plus the gross value of production for hogs produced without a contract. 
5 Feeder pig-to finish operations are defined as those on which feeder pigs (30-80 pounds) are purchased/placed, 
finished and later sold/removed for slaughter at a weight of approximately 200-260 pounds.    
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The average independent operation produced 2678 hundredweight of hogs, valued at  
$116,123 in 1998.  Due mostly to low hog prices, total costs in 1998 were actually higher than 
the value of production resulting in net losses of $28,793 for the average producer. Total feed 
costs in 1998 averaged $56,923 – the largest input in the production of hogs, accounting for 
39.3% of total costs for an average producer.  Corn comprised approximately 75.4% of the feed 
costs, soybean the remaining 24.6%.
6  Using the survey year (1998) as the base year, income 
from independent hog production in year t can be approximated as: 
 
()




























































 = ratio of feed costs in year t to costs in survey year, where 
c
t p  and 
s
t p  
are the deflated price of corn and soybean in year t, and φ  is the share of feed costs 
comprised of corn. 
98 FC  = feed costs in survey year. 
98 TC  = total costs in survey year (includes the costs of all inputs except unpaid labor).  
 
                                                 
6  Estimates of corn and soybean shares were derived from the average cost shares of grain and protein, respectively, 
in total feed costs in the 1998 USDA ARMS.    
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The estimated monthly value of production, total costs, and net income from 1988 to 
1998 are illustrated in figure 2. Ten years (1988-97) of monthly net hog income estimates are 
used to compute an expected independent hog farm income (return to unpaid labor) of $30,561 
having a coefficient of variation of 0.911. 
 
3.2 Contract Production 
To estimate the expected contract income 
C Y in 1998 we estimate how much more 
income an independent operation would have earned had it contracted – that is, the contracting 
premium  98 ∆ : 
 
(4)   98 98 98 ∆ + =
I C Y Y  
 
In the survey year of 1998, prices were well below their historical mean. Consequently, we 
would expect the contract premium in 1998 to be larger than average. For convenience, we 
define  t δ  as the per unit contract premium, so  q t t δ = ∆ , where q is total output.   
To measure the per unit contract premium, while controlling for differences in operator, 
operation, regional, and scale characteristics, we could use a linear regression: 
 
(5)  i i i i C X y ε δ β + + =  
 
where  i y  is the per unit net return to hog production for operation i ,  i X  is a vector of exogenous 
characteristics,  i C  is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the operation contracts.     
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However, it is possible that unobservable variables are correlated with both the farmer’s decision 
to contract and farm income. For example, farmer ability which is unobservable could be 
positively correlated with the decision to contract. This correlation could lead to an under-
estimation of the impact of contracting on income, if it were not accounted for (Greene, 714).  In 
the “treatment effects” sample selection model, the net benefits to contracting compared to 
independent production are given by the latent variable 
*
i C : 
 
(6)  i i i u Z C + = γ
*   
        1 = i C  if  0
* > i C , 0 otherwise, 
 
where  i Z  is a vector of farm and regional characteristics. If the latent variable is positive then the 
dummy variable indicating contracting  i C  equals one, and equals zero otherwise.  
If the decision to contract is determined by unobservable variables (management ability, 
regional characteristics, etc.) that also affect performance, the error terms in (5) and (6) will be 
correlated, leading to biased estimates of δ  (and β ).  We can account for this selection bias by 









































and by recognizing that the expected performance of contractees is given by: 
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[] i i i i X C y E ρ σλ δ β + + = = 1 
 
where  i λ  is the inverse Mills ratio. To derive a consistent estimates of δ  and β  we can use a 
two-stage approach starting with a probit estimation of (6). In the second stage, estimates of γ  
are used to compute the inverse Mills ratio, which is included as an additional term in an OLS 
estimation of (5). 
The result of the first-stage binomial logit estimation of (6) are presented in table 2. 
Estimation results indicate that for an average operation, an increase in years of experience in the 
hog business lowers the probability that the farmer will contract.  County-level measures of 
income and hog farm concentration are included as measures of the availability, and 
consequently the net benefits of contracting to growers. Contractors choose to locate and expand 
production in regions where they can operate most profitably -- where the opportunity costs to 
hog farming are low, or where there is a high density of hog producers, which lowers transaction 
costs.  While most hog farmers may have some opportunity to contract, the net benefits of 
contracting will be higher where the availability of contracting is greater.  As expected, being 
located in county with more hog production increases the likelihood of contracting, and being in 
a county with a higher average net return to farming lowers the probability that a farmer 
contracts.  The probability of contracting increases at a decreasing rate with the scale of 
production. 
The results of the second-stage selection model (5) are presented in table 3.   The 
variables associated with an increase in net returns include year in the hog business, being 
located in a Western state, and a larger scale of production.  The results also show that after 
correcting for observable operator, operation, and regional factors, and for unobservables    
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correlated with the decision to contract and net returns, contracting raised net returns by $17.91 
per hundredweight of hog produced in 1998.  The inverse Mills ratio is not significantly different 
from zero, indicating that we cannot reject the hypothesis of no correlation between the errors of 
the selection and treatment equations. 
With the estimate of the contract premium in 1998 ( q 98 98 ˆ ˆ δ = ∆ ), we can use (4) to 
estimate 
C Y98  -- what net returns would have been for a representative independent producer in 
1998 if they had contracted.  Next, we make two assumptions about the distribution of contract 
income in order to compute the mean and coefficient of variation of contract income. The first 















The second assumption is that the variation in contract income is a fixed proportion () 1 0 ≤ ≤ θ  
of the variation in independent income:  
 
(8)  I C σ σ θ = .   
 
In other words, contract income moves synchronously with independent income, but has less 
variation.  Plugging (8) into (7) and solving for the expected contract income gives: 
 
  ( )
I I C C Y Y Y Y 98 98 − + = θ . 
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From (8) it follows that the coefficient of variation of contract income can be computed: 
 











Table 4 presents a summary of the estimated means and coefficients of variation of net returns 
for independent and contract producers used to compute the risk and autonomy premia.  Three 
values for the contract risk factor θ  are used: a low value (θ  = 0) which implies that contracts 
provide perfect insurance; a “best guess” value (θ  = 0.1); and a high value (θ  = 0.2) which 
implies that contracts pass through a significant portion of income risk to growers.  These values 
are consistent with values reported in previous studies. For example, Johnson and Foster (p. 399) 
report standard deviations that are equivalent to values of θ  between 0.06 and 0.15 for four 
different types of hog contracts they consider.  Similarly, Martin (p. 272) reports an average 
value of θ  equal to 0.095 for 25 hog producers. 
As shown in table 4, estimates of the expected contract premium (the expected contract 
net returns less the expected net returns to independent production) are sensitive to assumptions 
about contract risk, θ . The estimated expected contract premium is negative if θ =0.0 or θ =0.1, 
equal to $-11,387 (-$4.25/cwt) and $-5452 ($-2.03/cwt), respectively. However, if contracts are 
quite risky (θ =0.2) then the large contract premium in 1998 estimated using the selection model 
implies that contract growers earn $484 ($0.18/cwt ) more on average than under independent 
production.     
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Tables 5 and 6 present the estimated risk premium and autonomy premium as a function 
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion R and the contract risk factor θ .  Table 5 presents the 
premia levels and as a percent of the average net returns for an independent hog operation.  Table 
6 presents the per-unit premia levels and as a percent of the historical price.  The range of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion ( 2 0 ≤ ≤ R ) in tables 5 and 6 correspond to values estimated 
in the literature.  For example, Szpiro using insurance data estimated that R is between 1.2 and 
1.8; Hansen and Singleton used aggregate data to estimate a value between 0.35 and 1.0; and 
Newberry and Stiglitz (pp 101-108) synthesize evidence from several empirical studies to 
conclude that R is in a range from 1-2.   
The high coefficient of variation of income for independent hog producers (0.911) means 
that if these producers are risk-averse, they would be willing to pay a sizeable risk premium to 
reduce their coefficient of variation to the level of contract producers (0.111 for θ =0.1). As 
shown in table 5 for θ =0.1, growers with moderate aversion to risk (R=1) would be willing to 
pay about $12488 or 40.9% of their expected total net returns for the risk-reduction benefits 
associated with the contract income.  As shown in table 6, this risk premium is equivalent to a 
price premium of $4.66/cwt., which is 8.7% of the historical price. 
Since a moderately risk averse grower is willing to pay $4.66/cwt to reduce risk but 
instead pays an estimated expected per-unit contract premium of only $2.03/cwt (from table 4), 
the difference ($2.63/cwt.) is the autonomy premium. In other words, a representative grower is 
willing to pay $2.63/cwt. (which is equivalent to 4.9% of the price) for the attributes associated 
with independent production. As shown in table 5, this autonomy premium has a total value of 
$7036 for a representative farm, which is equivalent to 23% of net returns.    
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Estimates of the risk and autonomy premia are sensitive to assumptions about growers’ 
attitudes towards risk. Additionally, the autonomy premium is sensitive to assumptions about the 
contract risk θ .  If we assume that growers are risk neutral (R=0) and therefore place no value on 
risk reduction, the estimated negative contract premium implies that growers are willing to pay 
for the right contract, by the amount of the contract premium ($2.03/cwt). In other words, a 
negative contract premium and risk-neutrality imply a negative autonomy premium. In contrast, 
if growers are quite risk averse  (R=2), then the risk and autonomy premium are quite large – 
equal to 81.7% and 63.9%, respectively, of net returns (for θ =0.1). 
There are two methodological issues worth exploring in future work. First, there may be 
ways for growers to manage price risk – such as futures markets – that would reduce the 
insurance value of production contracts for independent growers.  If this were the case, the 
methods used here would over-estimate the risk of independent production, thereby over-
estimating the risk premium and autonomy premium. Second, this study uses a representative 
farmer approach to derive estimates of the risk and autonomy premia. This approach cannot 
account for the likelihood that contractees are more risk-averse and have weaker preferences for 
autonomy than independent growers.  However, it is ambiguous, how this would bias the 
estimation results.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper uses detailed information on net returns to contract and independent feeder-to-finish 
hog production to estimate the value farmers place on their autonomy.  Estimates of the net 
returns to independent hog production using historical prices show that the risk-reducing 
properties of contracts are quite valuable to risk-averse growers. For example, under the    
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assumption that growers are moderately risk-averse, growers would be willing to pay about a 
price premium of about 8.7% to eliminate their income risk.  In addition, after controlling for 
operator, operation, and regional characteristics, and for possible sample selection bias – a 
representative hog farmer is estimated earn less under contract compared to independent 
production – equivalent to a 3.8% price reduction. The implication is that growers place 
significant value on the attributes associated with independent production - being willing to pay 
an estimated autonomy premium equivalent to about 4.9% of the historical price.  In other words, 
the autonomy premium for a moderately risk averse growers is worth a little over half the value 
of the risk premium. 
  Estimated values for the risk and autonomy premia are sensitive to assumptions about 
growers’ attitudes toward risk, and the risk reducing capacity of contracts.  However, over a wide 
range of reasonable assumptions, the autonomy premium is positive, large enough to be 
economically important, and of the same order of magnitude as the risk premium. This result 
demonstrates that analyses that compare the desirability of contracts based only on how they 
affect grower income distribution without considering the attributes of the production process 
that also affect grower welfare ignore important influences on farmer decision making. More 
specifically, the results demonstrate that not accounting for the value of autonomy would lead to 
an under-estimation of the fee necessary to attract farmers to a contract. Similarly, ignoring the 
value of autonomy in calculating a risk premium would result in an under-estimation of the value 
farmer’s place on risk reduction, or equivalently, an under-estimation of growers’ risk aversion. 
The study suggests several areas for future research. As mentioned above, there are many 
attributes associated with independent production. However, the approach developed here cannot 
determine the value of these attributes. For example, we do not know how much value growers    
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place on the right to make management decisions versus not having to worry about having a 
contractor renege on contract obligations. Estimating the value of the components of the 
autonomy premium would add to our understanding of grower incentives (Gillespie and 
Eidman).  Second, as mentioned in the last section, the study made several simplifying 
assumptions that may have biased estimates of the risk and autonomy premia.  Future work could 
attempt to account for the ability of growers to manage risk and to account for the likelihood that 
contractees are more risk-averse and have weaker preferences for autonomy than independent 
growers. 
As shown in this paper, input and product prices make hog production a risky 
undertaking.  Contracts have the potential to greatly reduce income risk for growers.  Economists 
and policy makers have long recognized the importance of risk in farmers’ choice of business 
arrangement, and many agricultural policies have focussed on developing infrastructure and 
marketing information to reduce risk.  On the other hand, few studies have taken into account 
factors besides risk and expected income in analyzing farmers’ decisions to contract.  Strong 
preferences for autonomy offer a potential explanation for why contracting is not more widely 
used and may explain why some farmers have lobbied for legislation to outlaw contract 
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L Y Y ,  = Income from independent production in a low and high income period, respectively 
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CE Y  = Certainty equivalent income from independent production 
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Figure 2.  Value of Production, Total Costs, and Net Returns Per Unit for a Representative 









Source: Value of production, total costs and net returns in 1998 from USDA ARMS. Estimates 
for other years computed using USDA NASS monthly price data (see text for details).  All 
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> t  
Operator and Operation Characteristics        
Age (years)  50.6  47.0  3.78  0.000 
Education (years)  13.0  12.9  0.06  0.953 
Years in hog business  24.1  14.8  9.03  0.000 
Total farm assets ($100,000)  7.62  8.70  -1.25  0.211 
        
Regional Characteristics        
Northern state (MI, MN, SD, WI)*  0.194  0.232  -1.02  0.306 
Southern or Eastern state  
(AL, AR, GA, KY, MO, NC, SC, TN, VA)* 
0.100 0.236  -4.03  0.000 
Western state (CO, KS, NE, OK, UT)*  0.159  0.067  3.20  0.001 
Central Midwestern state (IA, IL, IN,OH)*  0.548  0.463  3.17  0.064 
County aver. net cash return per farm ($1000)   34.86  46.54  -4.64  0.000 
County aver. swine sales per farm ($1000)  23.63  70.73  -6.80  0.000 
        
Output and Income        
Hog production (cwt.)
 (1) 2678  10672  -9.67  0.000 
Scale Class 1  (cwt. < 750)  0.374  0.061  10.39  0.000 
Scale Class 2  (750 ≤  cwt. < 2250)  0.309  0.204  2.64  0.009 
Scale Class 3  (2250 ≤  cwt. < 6000)  0.229  0.235  -0.15  0.881 
Scale Class 4  (6000 ≤  cwt.)  0.089  0.501  -11.80  0.000 
Net return per unit ($/cwt.)
(2) -24.33  -5.12  -9.89  0.000 
        
Number of Observations  233  244     
 
Note: All data are from the 1998 USDA-ERS ARMS except county-level variables, which are 
from the 1997 US Agricultural Census. Means are weighted to account for survey design. 
Prob> t  is the two-tailed significance probability under the null hypothesis of equal means.  
*  Dummy variable equal to 1 if statement is true or located in region, 0 otherwise. 
(1) Hog production is measured as hundredweight of hogs sold or removed under contract less 
hundredweight of hogs purchased or placed under contract, plus hundredweight of inventory 
change.  
(2) Net return per unit is defined as revenue from hog production less the costs of all inputs to 
hog production except unpaid labor that were incurred by the operator per hundredweight of 
hog produced. For independent producers, revenue equals the gross value of hog production. 
For contract producers revenue equals contract fees for hogs produced under contract plus 
the gross value of production for hogs produced without a contract. 
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Table 2. Logit Model Maximum Likelihood Estimation: Contract/No Contract 
 
Variable Coeff.  Std.Err.  t-ratio  P-value 
Constant  0.575 1.329 0.433 0.665 
Age  (years)  0.001 0.016 0.081 0.935 
Education  (years)  -0.240 0.083  -2.879 0.004 
Years in hog business  -0.058  0.015  -3.832  0.000 
Total farm assets ($100,000)  1.172  0.369  3.175  0.001 
Primary Occupation Off-farm   -0.002  0.015  -0.151  0.880 
Scale Class 2  2.762  0.570  4.843  0.000 
Scale Class 3  3.015  0.577  5.230  0.000 
Scale Class 4  4.793  0.611  7.844  0.000 
Southern/Eastern state   -0.244  0.447  -0.547  0.585 
Northern state   0.679  0.340  1.997  0.046 
Western  state  -0.324 0.461  -0.704 0.481 
Co. average net return per farm ($1000)   -0.023  0.010  -2.409  0.016 
Co. average swine sales per farm ($1000)  0.016  0.005  3.222  0.001 
      
 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Uses a Production Contract (1,0); Number of observations: 477; 
Log-likelihood = -191.18; McFadden pseudo R-squared = 0.41; Chi-squared: 231.2, Degrees of 
freedom: 13, Significance level: 0.000. The P-value is the value for a two-tailed test of the 
hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero. 
  
 
 Predicted  
Actual 0 1  Total 
0 194  39  233 
1 49  195  244 
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Table 3. Sample Selection Model Two Stage Least Squares Regression 
 
 
 Coeff.  Std.Err.  Coeff./ 
Std.Err. 
P-value 
      
Constant -44.596  11.370  -3.922  0.000 
Age  (years)  0.087 0.122 0.717 0.473 
Education  (years)  -0.298 0.707  -0.421 0.674 
Years in hog business  0.245  0.127  1.930  0.054 
Total farm assets ($100,000)  1.634  3.128  0.522  0.602 
Primary Occupation Off-farm   -0.118  0.123  -0.962  0.336 
Scale Class 2  15.715  3.608  4.356  0.000 
Scale Class 3  23.711  4.278  5.543  0.000 
Scale Class 4  25.820  6.804  3.795  0.000 
Southern/Eastern state   -0.375  3.205  -0.117  0.907 
Northern state   -4.503  2.766  -1.628  0.104 
Western  state  6.541 3.266 2.003 0.045 
Contract  17.914 8.756 2.046 0.041 
Lambda  -5.227 5.222  -1.001 0.317 
      
 
Notes: Dependent variable is Net Returns to Unpaid Labor. Observations = 477; Adjusted R-
squared = 0.28; Model test: F[13, 463] = 14.89, Prob value = 0.000; Estimated correlation of 
disturbance in regression and selection criterion ( ρ ) =  -0.242; The P-value is the value for a 
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Table 4. Estimates of Net Returns for Independent and Contract Hog Production 
 
 









Net return from independent production (
I Y )     
          Total (dollars)  30,561 27,834  0.911 
          Per unit (dollars/cwt.)  11.41 10.40 0.911 
      
Net return from contract production (
C Y )      
      = θ 0.0      
          Total (dollars)  19,174  0  0 
          Per unit (dollars/cwt.)  7.16  0  0 
      = θ 0.1      
          Total (dollars)  25,109  2,783  0.111 
          Per unit (dollars/cwt.)  9.38  1.04  0.111 
      = θ 0.2      
          Total (dollars)  31,045  5,567  0.179 
          Per unit (dollars/cwt.)  11.59  2.08  0.179 
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Table 5. Estimated Risk and Autonomy Premia as a Percent of the Average Net Returns 








       = θ 0.0       = θ 0.1       = θ 0.2       = θ 0.0       = θ 0.1       = θ 0.2 
0.0  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%)  0 (0.0%)  -11387  (37.3%)  -5452  (17.8%)  484 (1.6%) 
0.5  6338 (20.7%)  6244 (20.4%)  6092 (19.9%)  -5050 (16.5%)  792  (2.6%)  6575 (21.5%) 
1.0  12675 (41.5%) 12488 (40.9%) 12184 (39.9%)  1288  (4.2%)  7036 (23.0%) 12667 (41.4%) 
1.5  19013 (62.2%) 18732 (61.3%) 18276 (59.8%)  7626 (25.0%) 13279 (43.5%) 18760 (61.4%) 
2.0  25351 (83.0%) 24975 (81.7%) 24368 (79.7%) 13963 (45.7%) 19523 (63.9%) 24852 (81.3%) 
 
Note: The average net returns for an independent hog producer in the 1988-1997 period was 













       = θ 0.0       = θ 0.1       = θ 0.2       = θ 0.0       = θ 0.1       = θ 0.2 
0.0  0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)  -4.25  (7.9%)  -2.03  (3.8%)  0.18  (0.3%) 
0.5  2.37 (4.4%) 2.33 (4.3%) 2.28 (4.2%) -1.89 (3.5%)  0.30 (0.6%) 2.46 (4.6%) 
1.0  4.73 (8.8%) 4.66 (8.7%) 4.55 (8.5%) 0.48 (0.9%)  2.63 (4.9%) 4.73 (8.8%) 
1.5  7.10 (13.2%) 7.00 (13.0%) 6.83 (12.7%)  2.85  (5.3%) 4.96  (9.2%)  7.01 (13.0%) 
2.0  9.47 (17.6%) 9.33 (17.4%)  9.1 (16.9%)  5.21  (9.7%) 7.29 (13.6%) 9.28 (17.3%) 
 
Note: The average price for the 1988-1997 period was $53.75 in 1998 dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 